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Abstract
Kakwani and Lambert state the three axioms, which should be respected by an equitable tax system. Th  ey 
also proposed a measurement system to evaluate the violations of the axioms. One of the axioms, axiom 2, 
formulates the progression principle in income tax systems. Vernizzi and Pellegrino improved the alternative 
index to evaluate violations concerning the progressive command in a tax system. Th   e main aim of this paper 
is to compare the two indexes in order to evaluate violations of progressive principle in income tax system 
using the real data. We also check how the progressivity of taxes and skewness of income distribution aff  ect 
the measurement of the progressive principle violation.
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INTRODUCTION
Many authors defi  ne equity in income taxation by horizontal and vertical equity [Urban, Lambert 2008]. 
In this paper the equity in income taxation is defi  ned by means of three axioms, introduced by Kakwani 
and Lambert in 1998. Tax system is equitable if all axioms are satisfi  ed. Violation of them – by a personal 
income tax system – produces negative infl  uence on the redistributive eff  ect of the tax. Th   is negative in-
fl  uence provides the means to characterize the type of inequity present in a tax system.
Th   e three general rules requirement for the personal income tax system are named axioms by Kak-
wani and Lambert. As an axiom is defi  ned as a mathematical statement that is accepted as being true 
without a mathematical proof (it is a logical statement that is assumed to be true), we propose to name 2014
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these postulates as rules. Despite their arbitrary character, tax systems that violate them intentionally are 
very rare. Practical solutions in personal income tax systems are not, however, so clear. Tax deduction 
and exemptions – commonly used tax instruments – oft  en cause violation of these rules.
Let x1, x2 ,..., xn mean pre-tax income of n income units, who are paying t1, t2 ,..., tn in tax. We can write  X 
as a vector of x1, x2 ,..., xn and T as a vector of t1, t2 ,..., tn. In our analysis, household is set as an income unit, so:
x1   will denote pre-tax income of household i and
t1    tax payment of household i.
In this notation yi = x1 – t1 denotes post-tax income of household i and  ai =  ti
xi
   - tax rate for household i.
Th  e  fi  rst rule – Rule 1 – says that tax duty should increase monotonically with respect to taxpayers’ 
ability to pay. Th   is rule they written as:
xi ≥ xj ti ≥ tj .             ( 1 )
Because the inequalities are weak, postulate of “equal treatment of equals” could be treated as a special 
case of this rule. It also enables government to exempt taxpayers with the lowest incomes from having 
to pay tax. Th   is rule is named minimal progression principle.
According to Rule 2, the richer people must pay taxes at higher rates. Of course, a violation of mini-
mal progression automatically entails a violation of this principle. Th   e weak inequalities in rule 2 mean 
that proportional taxation is permitted.
Th   is second rule – progression principle – is defi  ned in the following way:
xi ≥ xj and ti ≥ tj ai ≥ aj .          ( 2 )
If tax system is ruled out by principles 1 and 2 taken together then it means existence of regression 
in the tax system.
Th   e last rule – Rule 3 – says that a tax, which satisfi  es the other two rules, should cause no reranking 
in taxpayers’ post-tax income. Th   is rule is called no-reranking criterion and can be written as:
xi ≥ xj and ti ≥ tj and ai ≥ aj xi – ti ≥ xj  – tj .        (3)
Th   e Rule 3 can be seen as a vertical restriction, ruling out “too much” progression.
1  VIOLATION OF THE PROGRESSIVE PRINCIPLE
Th   e most important for this paper is the second rule, the progression principle [Lambert 2001]. Violations 
of progression principle (also the others of rules) produces negative infl  uence on the redistributive eff  ect 
of the tax. In this context we should to be able to assess when the progression principle is not upheld and 
how much lost the redistributive eff  ect produces.
Th   e redistributive eff  ect is defi  ned as diff  erence between the Gini index for pre-tax income and 
the Gini index for post-tax income [Lambert 2001] could be decomposed into following way [Kakwani 
and Lambert 1998]:
RE = GX – GX – T = V – S1 – S2 – S3          ( 4 )
where: S1 – measures loss in redistributive eff  ect, caused by a violation of rule 1,
     S2 – loss in redistributive eff  ect, caused by a violation of rule 2,
     S3 – loss in redistributive eff  ect, caused by a violation of rule 3,
  
 V – value of redistributive eff  ect that might be achieved if all rules are upheld.
Th   e measures in decomposition (4) are defi  ned by Gini and concentration index.ANALYSES
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Let CZ,X denotes concentration index for attribute Z. Th   is measure is calculated in the same way as 
Gini index, but vector values of Z is ordered by incomes before taxation (X). If both orderings are identi-
cal (attribute Z causes no reranking of income), Gini and concentration indexes calculated for the same 
vector of incomes take the same value.
Whereas:
                                                                         
                                                                       
and
                                  ,
                                                                          
                                                                               
                                                                           
S2 always takes non-negative values and according Kakwani-Lambert methodology:
Th   e progression principle is violated
                          S2 > 0
If  S2  is zero, the progression principle is upheld.
Violation of rule 1 about minimal progression automatically entails a violation of the progressive 
principle (rule 2). It means that income unit pairs (i, j) for which rule 1 fails cannot provide violations 
of the progressive principle.
In next section we check how S2 measures violation of progression principle for real data.
2  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Th   e values of measure S2 as a measure of violation of progression principle was analyzed on the basis of 
Polish data from Wrocław-Fabryczna tax offi   ce for fi  scal year 2007. Th   is set of data contains information 
on income and tax paid for taxpayers that fi  le their tax return in the Municipality of Wrocław, tax of-
fi  ce (district identifi  cation) Fabryczna. In this analysis households are equated with couples of taxpayers 
who take advantage of joint taxation and fi  lled up the formulate PIT 37. Th   e analyses were performed 
by author’own programmes, written in the “R” language.
Population of 19 487 households was divided into subpopulations with respect to the number of 
dependent children. We created 4 sets: family without children, family with one child, family with two 
children, family with three or more children.
Table 1 presents measures S2 for each type of family and for pairs of units income which satisfi  ed or 
not rule 1. When rule 1 is violated and rule 2 is upheld, the measure of loss in RE due to violation rule 
to should be equal 0. It is not true for S2.
( ) ( ) ( ) X X X T
X
T
X
T C G G C V , , − + − ⋅ =τ , 
( ) X T T C G S , 1 − ⋅ =τ , 
( ) ( ) ( ) X T T X C G C G S
X
T
X
T , , 2 − − − ⋅ =τ  
X T X T X C G S , 3 − − − =
() ∑
∑
=
=
−
= n
i
i i
n
i
i
t x
t
1
1 τ . 2014
57
94 (2) STATISTIKA
For each group of taxpayers we observe that the measures S2 are greater than 0 for pairs of units (i,j) 
for which rule 1 is violated. According to Kakwani and Lambert methodology it means that, progres-
sion principle is violated. If we look at the mathematical record of the rule 2 (see formula (2)) it could be 
observed that for pairs of units (i,j) for which rule 1 is violated the rule 2 is not violated and the measure 
S2 could be zero. If we want to use this measure S2 we should fi  rstly eliminate from set of data the pairs 
of units (i,j) for which rule 1 is violated and next calculate measure S2. Elimination from data the pairs 
of units (i,j) for which rule 1 is violated is not a simple the task.
Pellegrino and Vernizzi (2013) introduced the correction of the measure of loss in redistributive ef-
fect, caused by a violation of rule 2 – S
*
2 – which can be used for full set of data. Th   e measures is defi  ned 
as follows:
                                                                                              ,          (5)
where:
n is a sample size, ai =  ti
xi
 , pi, pj are weights associated to ai and aj,             , μA is the average of ai,
i=1,…k. I 
Z
i–j, Ii–j
Z / X  are indicator function for attribute Z:
 
                                                                                    .
Table 2 presents values of the measure S
*
2 for analyzed sets of data.
Source: Own calculations
Table 1  Values of the measure S2 for fourth type of family
Parameter Rule 1 violated Rule 1 upheld Total
family without children
S2 0.001379 0.001717 0.003096
family with one child
S2 0.001213 0.000729 0.001942
family with two children
S2 0.001174 0.000443 0.001617
family with three or more children
S2 0.001582 0.00021 0.001792
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Table 2  The measure S2 for each type of family
Parameter Rule 1 violated Rule 1 upheld Total
family without children
S
*
2 0 0.001717 0.001717
family with one child
S
*
2 0 0.000729 0.000729
family with two children
S
*
2 0 0.000443 0.000443
family with three or more children
S
*
2 0 0.00021 0.00021ANALYSES
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We can observe that if S
*
2 = 0, it not necessarily true that S2. Th  e  measure  S
*
2 is demonstrating appropri-
ate behaviors for each of analysed data sets. In every case of pairs of units (i,j) for which rule 1 is violated 
the value measure S
*
2 is zero correctly. It proves that S
*
2 could be better measure for lost of redistribu-
tive eff  ect due to violation of progressive principle. Table 3 presents the results of decomposition of RE 
according formula (4) for four Polish data sets. For families without children, the personal income tax 
system reduces the inequality of income by 1.6 percentage points. Losses in this redistributive eff  ect due 
to violation of rule 1, 2 and 3 are 0.4 percentage points according to KL methodology or 0.3 percentage 
points according to VP methodology. Th  e  diff  erence appears as a result of diff  erence between estimation 
of the loss of redistributive eff  ect due to violation of Rule 2 according to KL and VP. Th   e inequity, result-
ing from violation of Rule 2, reduces overall redistributive eff  ect by 0.31 (according to KL) percentage 
points which is 19.13 % of RE or 0.17 (according to VP) percentage points which is only 10.80 % of RE. 
family without children
Gini for
pre-tax 
income
Gini for
post-tax 
income
RE Potential
equity Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 Total
Rules
Kakwani and 
Lambert
0.371782 0.355399 0.016382 0.020589 0.000951 0.003134 0.000121 0.004206
percentage of RE (%): 100.00 125.68 5.80 19.13 0.74 25.68
Vernizzi
and Pellegrino
0.371782 0.355399 0.016382 0.019195 0.000951 0.001740 0.000121 0.002812
percentage of RE (%): 100.00 119.19 5.92 10.80 0.75 17.46
family with 1 child
Gini for
pre-tax 
income
Gini for
post-tax 
income
RE Potential
equity Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 Total
Rules
Kakwani and 
Lambert
0.346474 0.323702 0.022772 0.025682 0.000854 0.001942 0.000115 0.00291
percentage of RE (%): 100.00 112.78 3.75 8.53 0.50 12.78
Vernizzi
and Pellegrino
0.346474 0.323702 0.022772 0.02447 0.000854 0.000729 0.000115 0.001698
percentage of RE (%): 100.00 107.45 3.75 3.20 0.50 7.45
family with two children
Gini for
pre-tax 
income
Gini for
post-tax 
income
RE Potential
equity Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 Total
Rules
Kakwani and 
Lambert
0.346507 0.318711 0.027796 0.030329 0.000797 0.001617 0.000119 0.002533
percentage of RE (%): 100.00 109.11 2.87 5.82 0.43 9.11
Vernizzi
and Pellegrino
0.346507 0.318711 0.027796 0.029155 0.000797 0.000443 0.000119 0.001359
percentage of RE (%): 100.00 104.89 2.87 1.59 0.43 4.89
Table 3  RE decomposition for taxpayers divided into subpopulations with respect to the number of dependent 
                children
family with three or more children
Gini for
pre-tax 
income
Gini for
post-tax 
income
RE Potential
equity Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 Total
Rules
Kakwani and 
Lambert
0.387007 0.353281 0.033726 0.036399 0.000782 0.001792 9.95E-05 0.002673
percentage of RE (%): 100.00 107.93 2.32 5.31 0.29 7.93
Vernizzi and 
Pellegrino
0.387007 0.353281 0.033726 0.034817 0.000782 0.00021 9.95E-05 0.001091
percentage of RE (%): 100.00 103.23 2.32 0.62 0.29 3.23
Source: Own calculations2014
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It is almost twofold increase for KL methodology in comparison with VP methodology. Th  e  diff  erence 
is so big that it is worth doing an investigation of why S2 – S
*
2 > 0and conditions when S2 can be a rea-
sonable approximation of S
*
2. Th   e second aspect of this problem is the fact that value of S2 infl  uences 
on the potential redistributive eff  ect. It is important because potential redistributive eff  ect informs us, 
what is worth mentioning, how removal of inequities due to violation of rules could potentially improve 
the redistributive eff  ect of taxation without increasing the marginal tax rates for the taxpayers groups.
Th   e total inequity in the Polish tax system reduces the redistributive eff  ect of taxation for group of 
family without children by 0.42 percentage points (according to KL) or by 0.28 percentage points (accord-
ing to VP). Th   ese results suggest that the absence of all mentioned inequities could reduce the inequality 
of income by 2.06 percentage points or by 1.91 percentage points (instead of 1.64 percentage points).
For the group of taxpayers with one, two or three or children we observe similar connection be-
tween S2.and S
*
2. Table 4 presents diff  erences between this two values for each type of family, which are 
always greater than 0. Th  e  diff  erences are from 4.22 to 8.51 points of percentage of RE for diff  erent type 
of families.
Type of family S2 S
*
2 S2 – S
*
2
S2 – S
*
2 
as percentage of RE 
(%)
0 children 0.003134 0.00174 0.001394 8.51
1 child 0.001942 0.000729 0.001213 5.33
2 children 0.001617 0.000443 0.001174 4.22
3 or more children 0.001792 0.00021 0.001582 4.69
Table 4  The diff  erences between S2 and S
*
2 for each type of family
Source: Own calculations
Where do the diff  erences come from? We are looking for conditions when we can use S2 as good 
approximation of S
*
2. We can give some thought if diff  erence S2 – S
*
2 depends on tax progressivity or on 
the skweness of income distribution. Below table presents S2 – S
*
2 and the measure of tax progressivity 
defi  ned by Kakwani (1977) as a diff  erence between the concentration index of taxes and the Gini index 
of the pre-tax income.
Π
K = DT – GX.             ( 6 )
Values of this measure are included in a range: Π
K ϵ [–1 – GX  , 1 – GX]. Positive values, Π
K >
 0, mean 
the progressive tax system. For the proportional system we receive: Π
K =
 0. Th   e negative values Π
K <
 0 
are describing the regressive tax system. Th   e measure Π
K could be interpreted as the percent of total 
fi  scal charges which remained changed from worse earning to the better earning for the eff  ect of the pro-
gressions of tax system.
name of set description
0 children 80% contains 80% taxpayers with the lowest income from set 0 children
0 children 90% contains 90% taxpayers with the lowest income from set 0 children
0 children 95% contains 95% taxpayers with the lowest income from set 0 children
0 children 97% contains 97% taxpayers with the lowest income from set 0 children
0 children 99% contains 99% taxpayers with the lowest income from set 0 children
0 children 100% taxpayers with 0 dependent children
Table 5  The name and way of create data sets for diff  erent types of skwenesses
Source: Own presentationANALYSES
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We can give also some thought if the diff  erence S2 – S
*
2 depends on skweness of income distribution. 
In order to do that we created data sets by cutting down the origin sets. In this way we created the fol-
lowing sets presented in Table 5.
In the same way we created the sets of taxpayers with 1, 2 or 3 dependent children. Table 6 presents re-
sults of analysis from each data sets. We calculated apart from diff  erences S2 – S
*
2, infl  uence the diff  erences 
on redistributive eff  ect –  S2 – S
*
2  as well as the skewness of income distribution and progressivity index.
                                         RE
Table 6  Results of analysis for created data sets
Data set S2 – S
*
2 RE S2 – S
*
2
RE
Skweness Π
K
0 children 80% 0.00112 0.00693 0.1618 0.14 0.089936
0 children 90% 0.00109 0.00700 0.1562 0.44 0.086222
0 children 95% 0.00111 0.00842 0.1321 0.74 0.097939
0 children 97% 0.00114 0.00966 0.1183 0.96 0.108245
0 children 99% 0.00122 0.01202 0.1016 1.48 0.126605
0 children 100% 0.00139 0.01638 0.0851 3.82 0.157335
1 child 80% 0.000853 0.009299 0.0918 0.06 0.163209
1 child 90% 0.000871 0.011029 0.0790 0.35 0.171039
1 child 95% 0.000910 0.013396 0.0679 0.66 0.188018
1 child 97% 0.000950 0.014993 0.0634 0.90 0.198983
1 child 99% 0.001041 0.018037 0.0577 1.44 0.219137
1 child 100% 0.001212 0.022772 0.0532 3.77 0.247409
2 children 80% 0.000713 0.010824 0.0659 0.03 0.240979
2 children 90% 0.000763 0.013927 0.0548 0.38 0.252356
2 children 95% 0.000815 0.016688 0.0488 0.69 0.264156
2 children 97% 0.000856 0.018205 0.0470 0.89 0.270102
2 children 99% 0.000960 0.021927 0.0438 1.46 0.289748
2 children 100% 0.001174 0.027796 0.0422 8.23 0.317156
3 children 80% 0.000580 0.008092 0.0716 0.12 0.362515
3 children 90% 0.000738 0.012809 0.0576 0.61 0.377318
3 children 95% 0.000839 0.016909 0.0496 0.9 0.383747
3 children 97% 0.000924 0.019023 0.0486 1.23 0.384923
3 children 99% 0.001122 0.024289 0.0462 1.89 0.399589
3 children 100% 0.001582 0.033726 0.0469 6.64 0.419609
Source: Own calculations
We can observe that for the lowest tax progressivity we have the biggest value of diff  erence S2 – S
*
2  
for each group. Consistently for the highest tax progressivity we have the smallest value of diff  erence 
S2 – S
*
2. Generally, the higher the skewness is – the higher the diff  erence between S2 and S
*
2. Only for 
0 children 90% set we have lowest diff  erence S2 – S
*
2 and highest skweness in compare with 0 children 
80%. On the other side if we are looking for conditions when we can use S2 as good approximation of S
*
2 
we should analyze infl  uence the S2 – S
*
2 on redistribution eff  ect. 4
th column in Table 6 presents this in-
fl  uence. We observe that the higher the skewness is, the lower the infl  uence of the S2 – S
*
2 diff  erence on 
redistribution eff  ect. Th   is relation we observe also for 0 children 90% set.2014
61
94 (2) STATISTIKA
CONCLUSIONS
We presented and compared two measures of violations of progressivity principle:  S2 and S
*
2. We car-
ried out an investigation for diff  erent income distribution and one tax system. We tried to understand 
the diff  erence between these indexes and conditions when S2  could be a reasonable approximation of S
*
2.
If we want to only check if progression principle is upheld or not we can use both methods: original 
Kakwani and Lambert or modifi  ed by Vernizzi and Pellegrino. If we want to assess the loss in the redis-
tributive eff  ect, caused by a violation of progression principle we should use recast index S
*
2.
We observe that the higher the skewness of income distribution is, the lower infl  uence diff  erence 
S2 – S
*
2 on the redistributive eff  ect. We observe similar simple correlation between the tax progressivity 
index and infl  uence diff  erence on the redistribution eff   ect.   
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